課程資訊
課程名稱
心智哲學專題:自我意識
TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
開課學期
98-2 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
梁益堉 
課號
Phl7737 
課程識別碼
124 M4340 
班次
 
學分
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期一2,3,4(9:10~12:10) 
上課地點
哲研討室二 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。
總人數上限:15人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/982self 
課程簡介影片
 
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課程概述

This is an interdisciplinary course on the nature of self-consciousness. What does it mean to say that I am conscious of myself? How is self-consciousness different from consciousness of objects? Can there be a distinction between self-as-subject and self-as-object? Traditionally, philosophers tackle these issues using only conceptual analysis. We intend to do more in this course. That is, we will draw on empirical findings in neural science to investigate the fundamental features of self-consciousness. Both philosophical views and empirical studies will be discussed. We will consider several empirical cases related to self-consciousness and examine their philosophical implications. By incorporating cognitive neuroscience into our discussions, we will learn how philosophers may make progress on these issues.
本課程分為下列單元:
1. Self-consciousness and Immunity
2. Mental Ownership vs. Body Ownership
3. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
4. Bodily Self-consciousness
5. Empirical Cases and their Implications
6. Philosophical Reflections the Next Steps
 

課程目標
There are three goals in this course: first, we aim to obtain a deeper understanding of the nature of self-consciousness. Second, students learn how to read philosophical texts carefully and write clearly. Third, students try to develop their own thoughts on some of the important issues.  
課程要求
學生除了得花功夫研讀困難的哲學作品,在上課時參與討論,評估各種立場的論證,也需要在作業中提出自己的觀點,並加以辯護。 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
指定閱讀
TBA 
參考書目
1. Metzinger, Thomas. (2008) Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples. In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

2. Metzinger, Thomas. (2003) Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 353-393.

3. Metzinger, Thomas. (2005) Précis: Being No One, in PSYCHE 11 (5).

4. Lenggenhager B, Tadi T, Metzinger T, Blanke O ( 2007) Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science;317:1096.

5. Blanke O, Arzy S, Landis T (2008). Illusory perception of body and self. In: Handbook of Clinical Neurology (Ed. G. Goldenberg) 88:429-458.

6. Blanke O, Metzinger T, Lenggenhager B (2008). Multimodal perspectives and locations for the self. Science E-letter.

7. Blanke O,. From out-of-body experiences to the neural mechanisms of self consciousness. Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press.

8. Lenggenhager B, Mouthon M, Blanke O (2009). Spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Conscious Cogn. 18(1):110-7.

9. Blanke O, Metzinger T (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends Cogn Sci. 13(1):7-13.

10. Petkova, Valeria, and Henrik Ehrsson. “If I were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping,” PloSOne 3 (2008): 1-9.

11. Petkova IV & Ehrsson HH. When right feels left: referral of touch and ownership between the hands. PLoS One (2009), 4(9): e6933, Epub 2009 Sep8.

12. Ehrsson HH. Rubber hand illusion. Oxford Companion to Consciousness. page 531-573, (2009) Oxford University Press. (editors Tim Bayne, Axel Cleermans and Patrick Wilken).

13. Ehrsson HH. How many arms make a pair? Perceptual illusion of having an additional limb. Perception (2009) 38, 310-312.

14. Ehrsson HH and Petkova VI. E-letters. Science (2008) 19 June.

15. Ehrsson HH. The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science (2007), 317:1048.

16. de Vignemont, Frederique. Body schema and body image—Pros and cons, Neuropsychologia (2009).

17. Shoemaker, Sydney. “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” The Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 555-567.

18. Vallar, Giuseppe, and Robert Ronchi, “Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the neuropsychological literature,” Experimental Brain Research 192 (2009): 533-551.

19. Bottini, Gabriella et al. “Feeling touches in someone else’s hand,” NeuroReport 13, 11 (2002): 249-252.

20. Liang, Caleb and Timothy Lane. “Self-consciousness and Immunity” under review.

21. Liang, Caleb and Timothy Lane (2009) “Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: the Case of Somatoparaphrenia”, Analysis, October, Volume 69, Number 4, pp. 661-668.
 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
Discussion & Presentations 
10% 
 
2. 
Mid-term paper and Final Paper 
90% 
 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
2/22  Introduction
1.Lane and Liang “Self-consciousness and Immunity”  
第2週
3/01  Somatoparaphrenia:
1. Bottini, Gabriella et al. “Feeling touches in someone else’s hand”(劉先捷)

The Body Swap Illusion:
2.Petkova, Valeria, and Henrik Ehrsson. “If I were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping”(李浩德)
 
第3週
3/08  Out-of-Body Experience

1.Lenggenhager B, Tadi T, Metzinger T, Blanke O. ( 2007) “Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness”(許樹和)

2.Blanke O, Metzinger T (2009). “Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood”(張峰賓)
 
第4週
3/15  Higher Order Thought and Pathological Self
1.Liang and Lane (2009) “Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: the Case of Somatoparaphrenia”, Analysis, October, Volume 69, Number 4, pp. 661-668. (涂均翰)

2.Rosenthal, David (2010) Consciousness, the self and bodily location. Analysis. (馮鳳儀)

3.Lane and Liang (forthcoming) “Mental Ownership and Higher-Order Thought: Response to Rosenthal”, Analysis.
 
第5週
3/22  Rubber Hand Illusion
1.Tsakiris and Haggard (2005). “The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited”(陳洵渼)

2.Ehrsson HH. (2009) “How many arms make a pair? Perceptual illusion of having an additional limb”(劉先捷)

3.Petkova IV & Ehrsson HH. (2009) “When right feels left: referral of touch and ownership between the hands”(劉先捷)
 
第6週
3/29  Rubber Hand Illusion:
1.Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach and Gallagher (2007). “On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections”(陳洵渼)
 
第7週
4/05  Rubber Hand Illusion:
1.Longo, etc. (2008) “What is embodiment? A psychometric approach”(李浩德)

2.Tsakiris. (2009) “My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership”(張峰賓)
 
第8週
4/12  First paper due &
Student presentation
 
第9週
4/19  1. Strawson, Galen. (1997) “The Self”  
第10週
4/26  1. Strawson, Galen. (1999) “The Self and the SESMET”  
第11週
5/03  Phenomenology of Self and Schizophrenia
1. Gallagher, Shaun. (2005) How the body shapes the mind, ch. 8.
2. Student presentation: Schizophrenia 
第12週
5/10  Phenomenology of Self and Schizophrenia
1. Gallagher, Shaun. (2005) How the body shapes the mind, ch. 8.
2. Student presentation: Schizophrenia 
第13週
5/17  Philosophy of self:
1. Metzinger, Thomas. (2005) Précis: Being No One

2. Student presentation 
第14週
5/24  Philosophy of self:
1. Metzinger, Thomas. (2005) Précis: Being No One

2. Student presentation 
第15週
5/31  Philosophy of self:
1. Metzinger, Thomas. (2008) “Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples”
2. Student presentation 
第16週
6/07  Philosophy of self:
1. Metzinger, Thomas. (2008) “Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples”
2. Student presentation 
第17週
6/14  1. Depersonalization, Dream, Locked-in syndrome
Anarchy Hand vs. Alien Hand
2. Student presentation